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Genocide: Sexual violence as acts of genocide

Submitted to the 16-26 February 1999
Preparatory Committee for the International Criminal Court

Proposal:

The general principle that sexual violence can constitute the acts of genocide should be stated as prefatory matter or as a chapeau to the elements of the crime of genocide.

Commentary:

Sexual violence as acts of genocide. With regard to the crime of genocide, the ICTR’s historic first decision on genocide in Akayesu develops the multi-faceted role of sexual violence in the genocidal campaign, concluding:

731. With regard, particularly to... rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such.

The general principle of incorporation. As a general matter, the Elements Annex must recognize, as does customary international law, that acts of sexual and gender violence also constitute other crimes against the person within the Court's jurisdiction under articles 5-8. This principle, explicitly stated in article 8 (war crimes),1 applies with equal force to articles 6 (genocide) and 7 (crimes against humanity).

Thus, the same acts which constitute crimes of sexual violence under 7(2)(g) and 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi), should also be prosecuted, inter alia, as genocide, torture, enslavement and inhuman treatment. This approach is consistent with customary international law developments particularly as summarized and articulated in the recent decisions of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals. See, e.g., the ICRC Non-Paper.

This "gender integration" process is further required by article 21's prohibition on discrimination based on gender in the application and interpretation of the statute. An explicit statement requiring the consideration of sexual violence in relation to the acts of genocide will ensure that it not be marginalized and treated, as in the past, as less significant than other forms of violence that function as instruments of genocide.

Sexual violence as the constituent acts of genocide. Thus, when it meets the intent and targeting criteria of the crime of genocide contained in article 6, sexual violence is an instrument or means of committing genocide in respect to each of the five enumerated "acts" of genocide, as follows:

Article 6(a)--Genocide by killing.

Sexual violence can be the means of causing death in the context of genocide. Both women and men can be mutilated sexually in a way that causes them to bleed to death.2 Women are frequently raped and left to die or raped as a predicate to being killed. For example, in Akayesu, the ICTR stated:

733. On the basis of the substantial testimonies brought before it, the Chamber finds that in most cases, the rapes of Tutsi women in Taba, were accompanied with the intent to kill those women. Many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves where the women were taken to be killed. A victim testified that Tutsi women caught could be taken away by peasants and men with the promise that they would be collected later to be executed. Following an act of gang rape, a witness heard Akayesu say "tomorrow they will be killed" and they were actually killed. In this respect, it appears clearly to the Chamber that the acts of rape and sexual violence, as other acts of serious bodily and mental harm committed against the Tutsi, reflected the determination to make Tutsi women suffer and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent being to destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process.

Article 6(b) Genocide by inflicting serious bodily or mental harm.

As a matter of customary law, already codified in this statute, rape and other forms of sexual violence are recognized as inflicting serious mental or physical harm on the victim and, in many situations as torture. In the Akayesu case, the ICTR interpreted serious bodily or mental harm "without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution." (para. 504). The role of rape and sexual violence was identified as the infliction of serious bodily and mental harm as follows:

731. . . .Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm. (para. 731). In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of rape and sexual violence described above, were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.

Article 6(c)--Genocide by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group.

The Akayesu decision interpreted this subsection to include methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction. (para. 505). In applying this subsection, the ICTR recognized that rape and sexual violence—with its combination of physical and psychological harm-- were inflicted on Tutsi women to destroy the spirit as a means of bringing about the physical destruction of the group:

732. The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against them. A Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the Chamber that she was not raped because her ethnic background was unknown. As part of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi, the Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects. Indeed, the Chamber was told, for example, that before being raped and killed, Alexia, who was the wife of the Professor Ntereye, and her two nieces, were forced by the Interahamwe to undress and ordered to run and do exercises "in order to display the thighs of Tutsi women." The Interahamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her, "let us now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman takes like." As stated above, Akayesu himself, speaking to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them: "don't ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes like." This sexualized representation of ethnic identity graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.

The opinion provides numerous examples of testimony demonstrating how the experience of rape and sexual violence are calculated to break the will to survive. For example, the ICTR recounted the testimony of a witness (and those who testify are among the strongest survivors) who could not count the total number of times she was raped and felt “near dead.” (para 421.) Others beg their assailants to kill rather than rape them. (para 430, 438). This evidence is particularly relevant to genocidal acts in 6(a) and (c).

Article 6(d) --Imposing measures intended to prevent births.

In Akayesu, the ICTR also recognized the various ways that sexual violence is intended to prevent births within the targeted group:

507. For purposes of interpreting Article 2(2)(d) of the Statute, the Chamber holds that the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.

508. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that measures intended to prevent births within the group may be physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led through threats or trauma, not to procreate.

Thus, the crime of forced pregnancy recognized in the ICC Statute can frequently be an instrument of genocide. Conversely, the effort to prevent births is exemplified in the Akayesu decision in a number of other ways: One witness who miscarried as a result of being beaten testified that the assailant said, “When rats are killed, you don’t spare rats that are still in the form of fetus.” (para. 428) Another witness observed the rape of a pregnant woman which forced the victim into premature labor before she died. (para 437). We note as well that the trauma and extreme stigma affecting women who have suffered sexual violence may render them pariahs, ineligible to procreate in their communities.

Article 6(e)--Forcibly transferring children of the group.

Here, the ICTR wrote:

509. With respect to forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, the Chamber is of the opinion that, as in the case of measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts o[r] threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.

In this regard, forced pregnancy, through manipulation of patriarchal norms which determine group identity by the identity of the father and imposing the identity of the enemy on the children born of that group, is another form of forcibly transferring children of the targeted group to another group.


1 Article 8(2)(a)(xxii) provides: “Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,... enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;” while article 8(2)(e(vi), applicable in internal armed conflict makes a parallel reference: “also constituting serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”
2 In the Tadic prosecution before the ICTY, sexual mutilation of a male prisoner was charged as a wilful killing. While the causation element was not sufficiently proven in that case and it a case involving genocide, the charge illustrates another potential connection between sexual violence and genocide.